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"Professional responsibility" is a very broad topic. It covers the full
range of a lawyer's responsibilities: to the courts, to the administration of
justice, to law reform, to the law making process, and to the public. To
reduce the topic to suitable proportions, I will discuss (in addition to
background information) only those matters relating to professional
responsibility which I believe may be critical to the profession in the
foreseeable future. The discussion is divided into six parts: (1) The
profession's monopoly over the practice of law and how it was acquired;
(2) what the profession considers to be the professional responsibilities of a
lawyer; (3) how the current standards of professional responsibility were
developed; (4) how the current enforcement of standards started and was
stimulated; (5) some attacks that have been made on current standards and
how the profession has responded to them; and (6) where I believe
professional responsibility should be moving and where it probably will
move in the future.
I. MONOPOLY ON PRACTICE, MONOPOLY ON REGULATION
Today the legal profession' in the United States enjoys a virtual
monopoly over the practice of law. The high courts of the states and the
District of Columbia, with the assistance of various commissions, boards,
committees, and bar associations designated by the courts as "arms of the
court," control the admission, the discipline, and the removal of attorneys
from the practice of law. The legal profession's monopoly control over its
practice is unique among the licensed professions. State and federal
legislatures have not effectively challenged the monopoly and the courts
have supported it because over the years the legal profession has developed
and enforced standards of professional responsibility considered to be in
the public interest. Legislative attempts to interfere with the monopoly
have been rebuffed by the courts, which have described attorneys as
"officers of the court" subject to the control of the courts and immune from
legislative interference under the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.
The profession has not always enjoyed this monopoly. Moreover,
recent developments would seem to indicate that unless the profession can
more clearly demonstrate that it will exercise its professional responsibility
* Former Director of the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility.
1. Used here to include the judiciary.
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in the public interest, rather than in the self-interest of lawyers, the
monopoly may not endure.
That lawyers as a class have never been popular in this country is
probably an inevitable result of the adversary system of our common law.
Even before the American Revolution, there were attempts to get along
without lawyers.2 After the Revolution, because of the Jeffersonian era's
dislike of all professions, standards for admission to the bar were dropped
and attorneys rarely were disciplined. Also, because the English system of
barristers and solicitors was never adopted in the United States, there were
no professional organizations to assume responsibility for the discipline of
attorneys until nearly a century after the Revolution.3
Early in the nineteenth century, American courts, particularly the
United States Supreme Court, began to reassert the English common-law
doctrine that the judiciary has inherent power to regulate those who
practice law.4 By that time, however, state and federal legislatures had
started to provide by statute for admission and disbarment. The courts
divided in their view of how to deal with this development. Some found
the right to practice to be subject to the control of the legislature and some
found it to be within the inherent power of the courts to regulate. The
division ended after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ex
parte Garland.' In that case the Court struck down an act of Congress
requiring attorneys to take an oath in order to be admitted to practice in
the federal courts. Subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and state courts uniformly began to support the inherent power of
the courts to regulate the practice of law.
With the development of major bar associations after 1870 (the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York was established in 1870 and
the American Bar Association [ABA] in 1878) and the formation of
integrated or "unified" state bars commencing about 1930, the organized
bar gave increasing support to the courts in their efforts to control the
admission and discipline of attorneys.6 Michael Doff states that
"[t]oday, every state except Texas specifically recognizes, by constitu-
tion, statute, court or bar rule, or case law, the inherent power of the
judiciary to regulate the admission and discipline of attorneys. 7 Dorf
concludes his comments on the regulation of the legal profession with a
note of caution. He indicates that the struggle between the courts and the
legislatures for control of the practice of law may not be over, for
2. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TImuS 135-44 (1953).
3. Id. at 182-85, 197, 249.
4. Dorf, Disbarment in the United States: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM. J. L.
& Soc. PROB. 1, 6-7 (1975).
5. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
6. Dorf, supra note 4, at 7-9.
7. Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
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[t]he inherent right doctrine is essentially one of tradition. As seen in the
early practices in the United States, it is dependent on the type of job the
courts are willing to do and the amount of responsibility they are willing to
assume. In the absence of effective judicial leadership, the legislative
branches of the states have no alternative bui to fill the void."
II. A LAWYER-DEVELOPED CONCEPT OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In 1958, a Joint Conference of the American Bar Association and the
Association of American Law Schools issued a statement of a lawyer's
professional responsibilities in the context of the adversary system.9 The
Conference noted that its concept, as applied to lawyers in the legal
profession, covers a wide range of relationships and obligations and that it
may vary in different situations. The statement reads in part as follows:
The legal profession has its traditional standards of conduct, its Codified
Canons of Ethics. The lawyer must know and respect these rules established
for the conduct of his professional life. At the same time he must realize that
a letter-bound observance of the Canons is not equivalent to the practice of
professional responsibility.' 0
In modern society the legal profession may be said to perform three
major services. The most obvious of these relates to the lawyer's role as
advocate and counsellor. The second has to do with the lawycr as one who
designs a framework that will give form and direction to collaborative effort,
His third service runs not to particular clients, but to the public as a whole."
In many developing fields the precise contribution of the legal profession is
as yet undefined.'
2
No general statement of the responsibilities of the legal profession can
encompass all of the situations in which the lawyer may be placed. Each
position held by him makes its own peculiar demands. These demands the
lawyer must clarify for himself in the light of the particular role in which he
serves.'
3
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC STANDARDS
The legal profession in the United States has been rather slow to
develop specific standards of professional responsibility. The most
significant developments took place in 1969 with the adoption of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility and in 1977 with the creation of an
ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards.
The development of specific standards for the legal profession in the
United States stems from the publication in 1854 of Judge George
Sharwood's lectures on "Professional Ethics." These lectures became the
8. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
9. Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Report, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958).
10. Id. at 1159.
11. Id.at 1160.
12. Id. at 1159.
13. Id. at 1218.
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basis for a Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association
in 1887. In 1908, the ABA published its original thirty-two "Canons of
Professional Ethics"; they in turn were based primarily on the Alabama
State Bar Association's Code of Ethics.1
4
In 1964, the ABA created a special Committee on the Evaluation of
Ethical Standards to examine the then current Canons of Professional
Ethics and to recommend changes. The action was prompted in part by
suggestions that the Canons of Ethics did not lend themselves to practical
sanctions for violations. On August 12, 1969, after nearly five years of
study by the Special Committee, the House of Delegates of the ABA
adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code represented a
substantial improvement over the Canons of Professional Ethics, which
were essentially admonitory in nature. The Code has three components:
Canons, which are admonitory; Ethical Considerations (EC), which are
precatory, and Disciplinary Rules (DR), which are mandatory. Since
1969, several amendments to the Code have been adopted by the House of
Delegates. Some of the amendments, such as those dealing with group
legal service and advertising, can be characterized as substantial.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS
In addition to the ABA's efforts to improve the standards of
professional responsibility expressed in its Code, the leadership of the
organized bar in the United States since 1967 has been active on a national
basis in efforts to improve the enforcement of lawyer discipline.
The profession's most productive efforts to improve its enforcement
of lawyer discipline were initiated in 1967 by the creation of an ABA
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (known as
the "Clark Committee" after its Chairman, retired United States Supreme
Court Justice Tom C. Clark). 15 Prior to the creation of the Clark
Committee the ABA had inquired into the enforcement of lawyer
discipline in 1920, 1946, and 1956, but those inquiries had no significant
impact. However, when the report of the Clark Committee was published
in June 1970,16 it was widely covered in the press, and on August 11, 1970,
it was unanimously approved by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association.1 7 It has since had considerable effect on the enforcement
of lawyer discipline in the United States. 8 In its report, the Clark
Committee stated that:
14. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COD, OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT i-ii (1977).
15. 92 A.B.A. REP. 126-27 (1967).
16. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION 01- DISCIII INARY
ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft
1970).
17. 95 A.B.A. REP. 539 (1970).
18. Doff, supra note 4, at 3-4.
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[a]fter three years of studying lawyer discipline throughout the
country, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous situation
that requires the immediate attention of the profession. . . Unless the
profession as a whole is prepared to initiate radical reforms promptl,
fundamental changes in the disciplinarv structure, imposed by those outside
the profession, can be expected. 9
Immediately following its approval of the Clark Report, the ABA
appointed a Special Committee to Coordinate the Enforcement of Lawyer
Discipline.20  During its three year tenure that committee assisted several
state disciplinary agencies in modifying their disciplinary structures and
procedures to incorporate Clark Committee recommendations. 2 ,
The notorious "Watergate affair" of 1973 greatly stimulated the
profession's efforts to improve the enforcement of lawyer discipline
because it concerned several prominent lawyers, among them the
President and the Attorney General of the United States. In that year, on
the recommendation of the Special Committee, the ABA replaced it with a
Standing Committee on Professional Discipline;22 it also implemented a
Clark Committee recommendation by establishing a professionally staffed
National Center for Professional Discipline at ABA headquarters in
Chicago. Since 1973, the Standing Committee and the Center have
coordinated their activities in furnishing professional training programs,
consulting services, and course and informational materials on lawyer
discipline to disciplinary agencies, individual lawyers, and law school
teachers of professional responsibility. In 1974 the Committee and the
Center developed (and have since periodically revised) Suggested
Guidelines for Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement.23 The Guidelines have
been widely used by the states to improve their rules.24
After the Clark Report was approved in 1970, the high courts of
nearly all the states strengthened their lawyer disciplinary systems by
adopting most of the Clark Committee recommendations as well as more
recent recommendations of the Standing Committee and the Disciplinary
Center. The high courts of fourteen of the nineteen "voluntary bar"
states25 (the exceptions include New York and Connecticut) have adopted
19. Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
20. 95 A.B.A. REP. 539 (1970).
21. 97 A.B.A. REP. 792-802 (1972).
22. The new committee was a standing (permanent) rather than a special (temporary)
committee, and it was larger a chairman was appointed at large in addition to 14 members, one from
each ABA geographical district.
23. STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE.MENT(3rd ed. 1977) [hereinaftercited as
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES].
24. Doff, supra note 4, at 17.
25. In the 19 "voluntary bar" states, attorneys are not required to become or remain dues-paying
members of a statewide bar organization as a prerequisite to the practice of law in the state as they are in
the remaining 31 "integrated" (or "unified") bar states (33 if the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
state-level jurisdictions, are included).
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court rules requiring all attorneys practicing in those jurisdictions to
register annually and to pay assessments to support the disciplinary system
established by their high court. In addition, three "unified bar" states-
Missouri, New Mexico and Rhode Island-have adopted rules requiring
all attorneys practicing in each of those states to pay an annual assessment
to support the lawyer disciplinary system established by their high court.
In most states there has been a substantial increase since 1970 in the
financial support lawyers pay to maintain their disciplinary enforcement
agencies. The Florida statistics are so dramatic that they merit comment
even though they are not representative; the Florida bar is among the
national leaders in its support of disciplinary enforcement.
In 1970, the Florida bar's disciplinary budget was $111,312. There
were four full-time persons on its disciplinary staff (two lawyers and two
secretaries), and the average cost of the disciplinary budget per member
(there were then 12,312 members) was $9.03. In 1978, The Florida bar's
disciplinary budget is $1,703,390. There are fifty-eight persons on its
disciplinary staff (seventeen lawyers, seven investigators, five law student
employees, six court reporters, three auditors, and twenty clerical
employees), and the average cost of the disciplinary budget per member
(there are now 24,300 members) is $70.12.26 The percentage of the Florida
bar's total budget allocated to discipline has thus increased from about
twenty-five percent in 1970 to over fifty percent in 1978. This graphically
shows the importance the Florida bar attaches to adequately funding its
disciplinary program, and these figures do not include additional money
allocated to Florida's Client Security Fund.
Since 1970 the high courts of over twenty states have followed the lead
of the Supreme Court of Michigan by adopting disciplinary rules
providing for public participation (lay or nonlawyer representation) in
their statewide disciplinary enforcement system.27 It has been my
experience that without exception these jurisdictions have been very
pleased by this change, finding that it has brought new and helpful insights
to their disciplinary problems and has increased the credibility of their
disciplinary systems with the public.
The high courts of a small but growing number of states have followed
another Michigan practice by amending their rules to open their
disciplinary hearings to the public after probable cause has been found and
formal charges have been filed against an attorney. 28 This change has also
been well received by the public and the profession in those states.
26. Conversation with Norman A. Faulkner, StaffCounsel and Assistant Executive Director for
Legal Affairs, the Florida Bar (Nov. 14, 1978). The 1978 employment figures are based on full-time
equivalents.
27. The Clark Committee report mentions (at 9) but does not discuss public participation in the
disciplinary process. Such participation is recommended in SuGGESTE D GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at
Rules 5,6. Since the publication of the third edition, other jurisdictions have added public members,
28. See also SUGGESTED GUIDELINES, supra note 23, at Rule 26(A) (1).
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Several states have instituted specific procedures to permit either the
audit or verification of lawyers' trust accounts by a board appointed by
their highest court.29 These procedures may or may not be directly linked
to the disciplinary process. The purpose of the procedures, which follow
the English and Canadian tradition, is to apprise attorneys of their
professional obligations in maintaining trust accounts and to provide for
the verification of such accounts. There has also been an increase in the
number and effectiveness of clients' security funds established by the bar to
voluntarily reimburse the victims of lawyer dishonesty. The trustees of
the New Jersey Clients' Security Fund recently made payments that
brought the total of its voluntary reimbursement payments to over two
million dollars.30
Prospects are also encouraging for improved lawyer discipline in
the federal courts. In 1975 enforcement of lawyer discipline in the federal
courts was disorganized and generally unsatisfactory. The rules varied
widely among courts; some lacked rules altogether. No funding was
provided for enforcement. When, in 1975, a legislative rather than a
judicial solution seemed likely, the ABA Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline arranged a meeting with representatives of the
Administrative Office of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Office of the
Federal Courts, and the Federal Judicial Center to try to resolve the
problem. As a result of this meeting, the Model Federal Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement were initially drafted by the ABA Center for
Professional Discipline and later more fully developed by the Standing
Committee in coordination with a subcommittee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. In February 1978, on the recommenda-
tion of the Standing Committee, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Federal Rules.3' On September 21, 1978, the Judicial
Conference approved the Model Federal Rules of Disciplinary Enforce-
ment and recommended their adoption by all district courts and courts of
appeals.32
V. ATTACKS ON CURRENT STANDARDS
Within a relatively short time after its national adoption in 1969, the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted in whole or
substantial part by all but a few states. Recently, however, the Code has
come under attack.33 It has been said, for example, that the Code favors
29. Eg., Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, and Washington.
30. Conversation with Richard L. Amster, Chairman of the Board of Trustees. Client Security
Fund of the Bar of New Jersey (Nov. 14, 1978). See generally Amster. Client's Securiu" Funls: The
New Jersey Stor, 62 A.B.A.J. 1610 (1976).
31. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN IBY TIlE Hot'SEoF DELEG,%TEsOF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 9 (Midyear Meeting 1978).
32. Letter from Elmo Hunter, Chairman of Administrative Committee. to John C. McNulty.
Chairman of ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline (Oct. 16. 1978).
33. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976); M. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETHICS iN ,
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the interests of lawyers rather than the interests of the public, and that the
Code is primarily concerned with the responsibilities of a lawyer in
litigation and does not give sufficient attention to the responsibilities of a
lawyer in other roles, such as that of counselor or government attorney.
Between 1963 and 1971, a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions affected bar standards of professional responsibility." Since
1975 other Supreme Court decisions have significantly affected certain
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 5 Recent litigation
has challenged other aspects of the Code and the operations of certain
unified state bars.36
In 1977 the American Bar Association responded to these develop-
ments by giving high priority to improving its Code of Professional
Responsibility. The ABA created a Special Committee on Evaluation of
Professional Standards and charged it with the evaluation of all aspects of
legal ethics, both substantive and procedural. The size of the Committee
has since been increased and its composition has been changed to that of an
ABA Commission, with nonlawyer as well as lawyer members. The
Commission expects to report a tentative recommendation to the ABA
House of Delegates by August, 1979, with a final report and recommenda-
tion to follow by August, 1980.
VI. THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I believe that the expressed (specific) standards of professional
responsibility in law, as in any true profession, should make it readily
apparent that the interests of the public are primary and the interests of the
lawyers secondary.37 I feel that many in the legal profession share the
ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN TIlE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); VtRDICTS O,4
LAWYERS (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976); Morgan, The Evolling Concept -of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional
Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.J. 639 (1977); Schnapper, The Myth of Legal Ethics. 64 A.B.A.J 202 (1978),
34. E.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971). UMW Dist. 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
35. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (solicitation); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down
prohibition of lawyer advertising); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (invalidating
minimum fee schedules).
36. The Department of Justice filed suit against the American Bar Association alleging a
violation of § I of the Sherman Act. United States v. ABA, No. 7601182 (D.D.C,. filed June 25, 1976)
(action dismissed in August 1978 on motion of Department of Justice). In Falk v. State Bar of
Michigan, filed in the Supreme Court of Michigan and now pending be:ore the court, petitioner relies
on Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) and seeks to hay,.- his obligation to pay bar dues
to the unified state bar limited to the amount used for "regulatory purposes." Falk v. State Bar of
Mich., No. 60722 (Mich., filed Nov. 30, 1977).
37.
There is much more in a profession than a traditionally dignified calling. The term
refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public
service-no less a public service because it may incidentally b,. a means of livelihood.
Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose.
R. POUND, supra note 2, at 5.
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dissatisfaction of much of the public with some of the standards of
professional responsibility expressed in the Code because they appear to
place the self-interest of lawyers ahead of the interests of the public. 38 For
this reason, I think that the doctrines of legal professional responsibility
will move toward giving primacy to the public's interests. I believe that
lawyers, as a whole, combine the idealism of their profession with a healthy
measure of pragmatism. They are justly proud of their privilege of self-
regulation but I believe they will continue to seek public participation in
formulating the profession's standards of professional responsibility.
In my judgment the ABA Commission, if it is to resolve the
uncertainties, conflicts, and disputes which have arisen over the provisions
of the current Code, must recommend generally acceptable alternatives to
existing provisions in at least the following subject matter areas of the
Code:
-unauthorized practice of law (DR 3-101 (A));
-geographic limitations on the practice of law (in view of problems inherent
in the current rapid growth of multistate law firm practice) DR 3-101(B));
-specialization or concentration of practice (DR 2-105(A));
--"benign" commercial solicitation;
a -
-group legal practice (DR 2-103(D)(4)(a)-(c)); and
-conflicts of interest (probably one of the most important areas and a very
difficult one to resolve) (DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D)).
Recently there have been some developments which would appear to
presage more appropriate standards. In Maryland, for example, the
organized bar recommended that the advertising provisions of the
Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility be amended to authorize
limited lawyer advertising. The Maryland Court of Appeals, however,
went beyond its bar's recommendation to adopt a much broader
amendment, essentially authorizing any lawyer advertising that is not
dishonest, misleading or deceptive. I believe the Maryland court acted
primarily in the interest of the public in allowing maximal dissemination of
information to those who wish to select a Maryland lawyer.
Other jurisdictions, such as California, are giving increased publicity
to individual cases of lawyer discipline. Instead of listing the names of
disciplined attorneys in a state bar publication of limited circulation,
California is using general press releases to publicize the names of
attorneys who receive public discipline (disbarments, suspensions, and
public reprimands), and the nature and extent of their discipline. Clearly
38. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 33, at 702.
39. Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
472 n.3 (1978). (Marshall, J., concurring) defined benign commercial solicitation as
solicitation by advice and information that is truthful and that is presented in a noncoercive,
nondeceitful and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotionally and physically
capable of making a rational decision either to accept or reject the representation with respect
to a legal claim or matter that is not frivolous.
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this action to inform clients and potential clients is in the primary interest
of the public.
The use of client security funds to voluntarily reimburse clients
who have suffered financial losses because of the dishonesty of their
lawyers has increased in recent years. This demonstrates professional
responsibility primarily in the public interest.
Today, despite problems in enforcing certain provisions of the Code,
the professional staffs of state disciplinary agencies are growing in size,
experience, and value to the profession and to the public. They are also
proving the wisdom of the Clark Committee's recommendation that
disciplinary complaints be processed by full-time professional staffs.
Prosecution of formal charges of gross negligence (repeated acts of
attorney neglect, usually concerning failure to perform agreed services for
their clients) is increasing. Through observation of their attendance at
annual ABA Disciplinary Workshops, their consultation with the ABA
National Center for Professional Discipline,40 and their use of the Center's
Disciplinary Research System, I have become convinced that disciplinary
agency staffs have greater knowledge of disciplinary enforcement and
professional maturity.
Moreover, the rapid growth of the bar has resulted in a preponder-
ance of younger lawyers. They generally are less resistant to change and
should benefit by the increased emphasis recently placed on professional
responsibility by the law schools, the organized bar, and the bar
examiners.
There are, however, many possible pitfalls on the road to the
formulation of wholly acceptable standards of professional responsibili-
ty. Their adoption may lead to further prolonged conflict between
"professional" and "guild or trade" oriented bar groups, between
consumer interests and the bar, and between the courts and the
legislatures. The outcome of the Falk petition,41 now pending in
Michigan, may adversely affect unified state bars, which are numerous and
important in the United States. It could hamper their work in the delivery
of legal services and in specialization, to mention but two areas of
concern. If recent developments in Montana are any indication, support
may be building in the states for some kind of limitation on the previously
unfettered constitutional power of their high courts over admission (and
perhaps over discipline) of attorneys. 2
In the face of so many variables it would be foolhardy to try to predict
40. On July 17, 1978, the ABA National Center for Professional Discipline was enlarged in site
and scope and became the ABA National Center for Professional Responsibility. Personnel and
functional responsibility for disciplinary enforcement, professional standards, and related research
support were combined.
41. Falk v. State Bar of Mich., No. 60722 (Mich., filed Nov. 30, 1977).
42. A proposed constitutional amendment was adopted by the Montana Legislature and
appeared on the Montana ballot in November 1978. The proposition failed. Had it been approved by
the voters, the Montana Legislature would have been authorized to veto rules adopted by the Montana
Supreme Court governing admission to the practice of law in Montana.
[Vol. 39:689
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
with any certainty what specific standards of professional responsibility
will prevail in the twenty-first century, whether the standards will be
specific or general, or whether they will be established by the courts or the
legislatures. On the whole, however, I am optimistic about the future.
Communication between the leadership of the bar and its rank and file,
while never entirely satisfactory, is improving and I believe it will continue
to improve.43
I am also optimistic that the ABA Commission on the Evaluation of
Standards will recommend, and the ABA House of Delegates ultimately
will approve, standards of professional responsibility that will clearly
reflect the priority of public interests over the interests of lawyers. I
believe the standards will be expressed either in a wholly new and
expanded Code of Professional Responsibility or, more likely, as a
restatement of law.
In my judgment, the profession must also give much higher priority to
the resolution of client grievances such as fee disputes, delay, and failures
to communicate. These examples of "bad practice" rarely warrant the
imposition of discipline, but collectively they bring the profession an over-
abundance of ill will. Unless better methods of resolving them are
devised, these problems could contribute to a public revolt against the
bar's privilege of self-regulation. Despite the attendant legal difficulties,
mandatory arbitration of these matters pursuant to high court rule may
prove to be the only effective solution.
Improvement is also badly needed in the methods of resolving
problems of alleged lawyer incompetence. The Commission should
confront this problem and, one hopes, resolve it. In my view, questions of
competence should be handled by peer review, largely outside the
disciplinary process.
In this process of improving and refining the profession's standards of
professional responsibility, it is essential that the organized bar continue to
seek the cooperation and leadership of the high courts of the state and the
federal systems. Ultimately, the professional responsibility of the legal
profession rests with them.
43. The current president of the American Bar Association, S. Shepherd Tate, % hile president-
elect nominee and chairman ofthe Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, led his committee's
successful attempt at the ABA Midyear Meeting in Philadelphia in February 1977 to prevent the
tabling of a proposal on lawyer advertising that would have removed nearly all restraints on lawyer
advertising. In its place, Tates committee introduced a substitute amendment (which was adopted)
permitting limited advertising.
William 0. Spann, the immediate past president of the ABA and present member of the ABA
Board of Governors, while president, cosponsored and appointed the Commission on the Evaluation
of Standards. He also publicly advocated fewer professional restraints on lawyers that might impair
their first amendment rights.
The ABA president-elect, Leonard Janofsky, is a former president of the State Bar of California. a
state known for the innovative nature of its disciplinary program.
John C. McNulty is chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and
chairman of the Board of the American Judicature Society. He has had considerable success in
working with the Appellate Judges Conference of the ABA and the Judicial Conference of the United
States to coordinate adoption of standards and rules of disciplinary enforcement affecting both judges
and lawyers.
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